Readout 003

When Your Security Team Doesn't Work for You

Thousands of contract security officers in California are preparing for a possible strike this week, potentially affecting some of the largest technology companies in the country. The labor issues behind the dispute will be resolved at the bargaining table. From a corporate security perspective, however, there is another issue worth examining.

Many companies outsource a significant portion of their physical security operation. There are good reasons for doing it, and contract security can provide tremendous flexibility, scale and access to resources.

But outsourcing the people performing the work does not outsource the company's responsibility for the function. That distinction becomes very clear when the vendor can no longer provide the service.

A security officer at a corporate facility may be responsible for much more than standing at an entrance. Depending on the location, contract officers may control access, screen visitors, monitor alarms and cameras, respond to incidents, support evacuations, receive after-hours notifications, protect restricted areas and serve as the first person employees contact when something doesn't look right.

Remove that capability from a facility and the question isn't simply, "Who is going to stand at the front desk?" The question is which parts of the operation can continue safely without it.

The vendor's staffing problem can become your operational problem

Companies routinely evaluate vendors based on cost, staffing levels, service requirements and performance. I also want to understand what happens when the vendor cannot deliver the service at all.

A labor action is one example, but it isn't the only one. Severe weather, a regional emergency, transportation disruption, widespread illness, civil unrest or even a problem internal to the vendor can affect its ability to put qualified people at your facilities. That possibility should already be part of the security plan.

If twenty officers are normally required across a group of facilities and tomorrow only twelve are available, somebody needs to know which eight positions can be temporarily removed and which twelve cannot. That decision shouldn't be made for the first time at 5:00 in the morning when officers fail to arrive.

The same applies if staffing falls further. At what point are entrances consolidated? Which areas are restricted? Can technology temporarily support a function normally performed by an officer? Which employees need to work remotely? Which operations require a physical security presence to continue? At what point does a facility close?

Those decisions require an understanding of the business, not simply the guard schedule.

Contingency staffing is not the same as contingency planning

A common response to a potential staffing disruption is to ask the security provider how it intends to fill the posts. That's an important conversation, but it isn't the entire contingency plan.

Replacement personnel still have to know the facility, understand the post orders, recognize escalation procedures, operate the technology and know what authority they have when something happens. Putting an unfamiliar officer at a critical post may technically fill the position without restoring the capability that position normally provides.

That becomes even more important at facilities with sensitive operations, executive populations, proprietary information, specialized access requirements or an elevated threat environment.

The company therefore needs its own plan alongside the vendor's staffing plan.

That includes understanding which functions are critical, what minimum staffing actually looks like, what can be consolidated or supported differently for a limited period, and who has authority to change the operating posture as conditions change.

Outsourcing should never mean losing visibility

There is another lesson here that extends well beyond a potential strike.

When a security program relies heavily on contract personnel, the company still needs enough internal knowledge to understand how the operation works without depending entirely on the vendor to explain it.

Who knows the posts? Who understands why they exist? Which ones are driven by actual risk and which ones are there because they've always been there? Which locations could operate differently for 24 hours, and which ones couldn't?

If the answer to those questions lives entirely with the contractor, the company has outsourced more than staffing. It has outsourced part of its institutional knowledge. That's a vulnerability.

A good vendor should be a partner in the security program, but the company has to remain the owner of the risk.

Consider This

If a significant portion of your security workforce became unavailable tomorrow, you should already know what happens next.

That means identifying critical posts and functions, establishing minimum staffing requirements, determining what can be consolidated or temporarily supported by technology, defining when operations need to change, and making sure replacement personnel can actually perform the duties they're being asked to assume.

It also means including contract security providers in business continuity and crisis planning rather than treating guard staffing as a separate vendor-management issue.

The current labor dispute in California may be resolved before a single officer misses a shift. The underlying question remains relevant regardless of what happens at the bargaining table. You can outsource the security workforce. You cannot outsource responsibility for the security operation.